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The Concept in Life and the Life of 
the Concept 
Canguilhem’s Final Reckoning with Bergson 
Alex Feldman 
Pennsylvania State University 
To read Georges Canguilhem and Henri Bergson together in North America, 
it is necessary first to dispense with a certain folklore about the history of 
twentieth-century French philosophy. Foucault famously divided that 
history between “a philosophy of experience, meaning, and the subject” and 
a “philosophy of knowledge, rationality, and the concept,” with Bergson 
ranged in the first camp and Canguilhem in the second.1 Unsuspecting 
readers have often failed to realize that this proclamation was in fact a 
complex rhetorical gesture: a quotation of statements made by Canguilhem a 
decade earlier in response to Sartre.2 What is true is that the Anglophone 
reception of Bergson and Canguilhem has been quite different. Bergson had 
fallen into nearly total oblivion by the beginning of the 1960s, only to enjoy a 
minor revival in continental philosophy due in large measure to Deleuze.3 
For his part, Canguilhem has remained a more peripheral figure.4 The 
success of Dominique Lecourt’s influential if outdated Marxism and 
Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault explains in part why 
Canguilhem, when read at all, is often assimilated to the current in the 
philosophy of science called “historical epistemology.”5 The rediscovery, 
however, of a number of juvenilia and occasional writings and the 
publication of Canguilhem’s Œuvres complètes has produced a shift in the 
Francophone interpretation towards Canguilhem’s broader philosophy of 
values and philosophy of life.6 As it turns out, Canguilhem was a careful 
and frequent reader of Bergson. Rethinking Canguilhem’s philosophical 
project today requires us to return to his complicated relationship with 
Bergson.7  
If, to speak like Bergson, Canguilhem possesses a basic philosophical 
intuition, it is that philosophy must necessarily seek out what is strange or 
foreign to it, but not in order to reduce it to the identity of the philosophical 
concept: “Philosophy is a reflection for which all foreign material is good, 
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and we would gladly say for which all good material must be foreign.”8 
Canguilhem refused the closure of the history of philosophy upon itself and, 
much like Bergson, wanted to reinvigorate philosophy through contact with 
the history of scientific and technical practices.9 Yet Canguilhem did not 
abandon philosophy for a scientistic positivism. Indeed, in “Le concept et la 
vie” (“The Concept and Life”), he interweaves the history of biology with a 
drawn-out battle between Aristotle and Bergson on the questions of the 
being of life and the possibility of biological knowledge.10 This 1966 essay 
represents a kind of final reckoning with Bergson, whom Canguilhem had 
first begun to read appreciatively in the late 1930s.11 But the particular 
problem that preoccupies him in 1966 is the relation between human 
knowledge of life and the “logic of life” itself as formation of forms, between 
vital order and the thought of that order.  
In the first section, I will cover the basic argument of “Le concept et la 
vie,” emphasizing Canguilhem’s criticisms of Bergson. The second section 
will address these criticisms from Bergson’s perspective, but also restore the 
original way in which he thinks the problem of vital order. Many of 
Canguilhem’s criticisms, I will argue, fall short because they fail to take into 
account Bergson’s rethinking of ontology, but I will return, in the final 
section, to several deep points of similarity even after the 1966 essay.   
 
I 
“Le concept et la vie” appears at first glance to address a modification of the 
Kantian theme: how knowledge of life is possible? The answer would then 
be a strong realism: the general concepts according to which biology thinks 
living beings are already in life itself, rather than being projections of the 
mind’s own organizing tendencies.12 What is surprising about the text, 
especially given Canguilhem’s earlier works, is that the question seems to 
have been answered by developments in the sciences themselves and not by 
philosophy. The displacement of mechanical concepts in biology by 
information concepts and the discovery of the structure of DNA suggests a 
return to Aristotelianism: “To say that biological heredity is a 
communication of information is, in a certain sense, to return to 
Aristotelianism, if it means admitting that there is a logos in the living being 
that is inscribed, conserved, and transmitted. […]  To define life as a sense 
inscribed in matter is to admit the existence of an objective a priori, a 
properly material and no longer merely formal a priori.”13 
Yet, against any claim that scientific results of themselves are sufficient 
to determine answers to philosophical questions, Canguilhem proceeds by 
way of a lengthy history of philosophical treatments of the problem of 
concept and life that is not limited to how knowledge is possible, but also 
extends to what knowledge is. As he famously concludes the essay, 
“Contemporary biology, read in a certain way, is in some sense a philosophy 
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of life.” Does this “read in a certain way” entail a specifically philosophical 
eye? Just before this sentence, Canguilhem has asked: “What then is 
knowledge [connaissance]? […] If life is sense and concept, how should we 
conceive knowing?”14 Knowing, in other words, is not taken to be a sui 
generis form of activity, but rather as a special way of living. Consequently, if 
the essay has bearing on epistemological concerns, it hardly approaches 
them from the vantage of a search for absolute foundations in the face of 
Cartesian skepticism. The opening lines of the essay clarify, indeed, that the 
possibility of biological knowledge is only one of the questions to be 
addressed. Life (la vie) in French can suggest either “the universal 
organization of matter” or the “lived experience” of a particular organism, 
what Canguilhem calls the difference between vivant and vécu. He claims 
that the former takes philosophical property over the latter.15 By starting 
with the vivant, in the sense not of the singular living being but of what is 
“living in the living,” Canguilhem goes back behind the traditional 
epistemological division between subject and object to the point from which 
both arise, presumably to something like the natura naturans of life as 
production both of forms and of the modes of knowing these forms.16 He is 
interested in both the “nature and value” of the concept and the “nature and 
sense [sens] of life.”17 In other words, Canguilhem’s is pursuing a critical 
investigation into the normativity not merely of certain concepts, but of 
biological knowledge itself—the question of the value of knowing, the value 
of the truth. 
Starting with the vivant puts out of play all intellectualist theories of 
knowledge that presuppose a timeless ontology of archetypal ideas or an 
equally timeless table of categories certified by a transcendental subject. But 
without these traditional options, it becomes difficult to account for the 
order that life exhibits, its amenability to being grasped under concepts. The 
problem of order in biological nature thus unfolds along two axes in 
Canguilhem’s own thought: first, the distinctiveness of that order from the 
physical order of matter and, second, the “source” of the order of life. One 
way to address the second problem would be to find the source of this order 
in life itself (Aristotle’s solution). In this case, the concept is both substance 
and definition, ousia and logos; to go one step further, Aristotle treats order 
in the terms of a logic of classification. As unity in difference, the concept 
then finds its reality in the genera and species of the natural world.18 A 
philosophy of the immanence of order to life itself, taken to its natural 
conclusion, must treat that which grasps this order (the mind) as immanent 
to life as well. Such a naturalistic and classifying approach must then take 
the intellect itself as simply one more natural character indicative of a 
specific difference, much as the claw or a beak might be the defining 
difference between other animal species within a common genus. Yet the 
openness of human intelligence to an infinite horizon of knowledge attests a 
profound disanalogy between the mind and, for example, the claw: reason is 
a capacity to know (potentially) all the forms that make up the natural 
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order.19 In this sense, and unlike other organs, the scope of what the intellect 
can seize or grapple with is unbounded.   
As for the first problem (the relationship between vital and material 
order), Aristotle rejects any “mathematical model of the living being.” His 
biological concepts are only the realization of a “non-deliberative natural 
logos,” the realization of nature’s “art” and not that of a calculating “artisan” 
or craftsman.20 It is within this framework that Canguilhem introduces his 
first set of objections to Bergson. First, in condemning all of Greek 
metaphysics for ignoring the reality of duration in Chapter IV of Creative 
Evolution,21 Bergson neglected the difference between Plato and Aristotle on 
mathematics and thus conflates mathematics with logical classification; 
second, Bergson retains an antiquated idea of mathematics as the measuring 
geometry of the homo faber, despite a profound transformation of geometry 
by Gaspard Monge and Jean-Victor Poncelet away from the model of space 
that is the object of Bergson’s unending critique and toward a focus on 
qualities and alterations. Finally, Bergson is ignorant of genetics. In sum, one 
finds here the “philosophical theme” of the “incompatibility of knowledge 
and life,” as it is “often played with what we could call a Bergsonian 
accompaniment.” The ambition of Bergson’s philosophy is reduced to the 
tired early twentieth-century cliché that life escapes all knowledge and the 
knowledge is inimical to life. Bergson is taken to have argued that life is 
fundamentally becoming (devenir) and that all repetition of forms, e.g., the 
morphological similarities of members of a species, is merely a 
“generalization” of infinitesimal and constantly changing individual 
variations.22 We might say that Bergson has merely inverted Platonism but 
has not overcome it: being (repetition) is inverted into the inessential and 
becoming (difference) into the essential.23 Genetics, Canguilhem holds, 
refutes this treatment of stability and repetition as merely phenomenal by 
demonstrating the existence of a material basis of transformation in the 
genetic code passed along between generations of a species.24  
This first swipe at Bergson is, however, directed less at the philosopher 
himself than at what might be called a certain version of “Bergsonism.”25 For 
our purposes, the most significant claim will turn out to be the proximity of 
Bergson to Aristotle’s sense of the non-mathematical production of vital 
forms—a question of art. In the remainder of the first section of the essay, 
Canguilhem gives a broad critical account of nominalism and the problem of 
resemblance, ending with a discussing of Kant and Hegel.26 Rather than 
explore the richness of what amounts to a general history of the philosophy 
of life, however, I will focus for the remainder exclusively on the criticisms 
of Bergson. 
My worry is that by starting from a certain Bergsonism rather than from 
Bergson, Canguilhem risks distorting the latter precisely on the point that is 
so often held to be his stumbling block: the question of repetition. The 
caricature of Bergson in the first section of the essay, as well as the 
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juxtaposition of those pages with the subsequent discussion of individuality 
and nominalism, risk making Bergson himself into a nominalist, in spite of 
his explicit rejection of the basic postulate of nominalism: the existential 
primacy of individuals.27 To Canguilhem’s credit, he is hardly content to 
reduce Bergson to an image based on little more than a hasty reading of 
Creative Evolution. For this reason, he returns to the problem of repetition 
and generality in the second section of his article, where he engages much 
more carefully with the arguments of Bergson’s other philosophical works.28 
The argument moves in three stages: from a general claim about the creative 
duration of life in Creative Evolution, to a reading of the discussion of the 
general idea in Chapter III of Matter and Memory, and thence to a supposed 
shift in Bergson on the general idea that occurs in the second introduction to 
The Creative Mind.29 
1. Canguilhem quotes: “Real duration is that in which each form flows 
out of previous forms, while adding to them something new, and is 
explained by them as much as it explains them.”30 From this statement—
which occurs near the end of the book in the context of a critique of post-
Kantian philosophical systems—Canguilhem concludes that the novelty 
introduced by duration is not deducible from any concept or prior model 
and hence can “only be grasped by an intuition.”31 In other words, the living 
form is not the realization of an idea, of a possibility. But from this claim it in 
no way follows that the production of a vital form is unintelligible, a pure 
event. Canguilhem does not appear to recognize here that he has given only 
half the story, for, after the fact, the “simple movement” of duration is 
decomposable into a limitless number of ideas from which, retroactively, an 
explanatory chain of events can be constituted.32 It is strange that 
Canguilhem has chosen to draw a definition of duration in Bergson from 
this particular passage.  
2. Canguilhem believes that Bergson runs into difficulty in accounting 
for the origin of concepts. First, in the famous discussion of general ideas 
from Matter and Memory,33 Bergson roots consciousness in the utilitarian 
actions of the embodied living being, where the complexity of physiological 
and anatomical structure means that a certain “zone of indetermination” 
opens up in the organism’s comportment—a kind of vital and practical 
freedom. From this indetermination, need (besoin) operates a process of 
selection of useful resemblances that brings about a regularity of external 
stimulus on the organism and response by the organism. In other words, the 
general idea is thought on the model of the acquisition (“contraction”) of a 
habit. Hence the famous passage that Canguilhem cites: “But need goes 
straight to the resemblance or quality; it cares little for individual 
differences… It is the grass in general which attracts the herbivore.”34 
Canguilhem reads this contraction of a habit as the “imprinting” on the 
body of a certain stability of habits and attitudes, that is, a “lived and felt 
resemblance, or, if you prefer, a resemblance automatically played out.”35 
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According to Canguilhem, Bergson makes appeal (“en quelque sorte”) to the 
model of “reflex functions in the nervous system” to understand this habit-
forming process. From this prefiguration of the general idea that is given 
mechanically, reflection leads to the idea of the general idea in general—the 
genus (genre).36  
3. The Creative Mind, finally, leads in a new direction: Bergson moves 
“from the idea of resemblance as identity of organic reaction to the idea of 
resemblance as identity of the nature of things.”37 The shift is from a 
physiological to a more broadly biological perspective. Generalization is a 
function proper to all living beings at all levels.38 I have restored the full 
passage from which Canguilhem cites: 
[I]t still remains for us to find out how natural general ideas, which 
serve as a model to others, are possible, and why experience 
presents us with resemblances which we have only to translate into 
generalities. Among these resemblances there are some, naturally, 
which go to the fundamental root of things. […] It might be useful, 
therefore, at this point to digress upon what one might call 
objective generalities, inherent in reality itself.39  
Of the three types of general ideas discussed by Bergson—vital, geometric, 
and those produced by society and fabrication—the first two can be said to 
be founded upon “objective generalities,” but not in the same way. The 
resemblances detected in unorganized matter are, at the limit, mathematical 
and measurable identities, whereas what Bergson calls vital resemblances 
truly are resemblances and not merely “partial identities.”40 
Bergson does not, unfortunately, explicitly spell out the relationship 
between the “objective resemblances” of biology and biological ideas. 
Canguilhem notes that Bergson tends to use the language of the “as if” 
(comme si): in the structuration of living beings, the resemblance of 
properties, and the hierarchical arrangement of living beings according to 
the scale of transmission, life acts or works as if it were following a concept.41 
But whereas the Kantian “as if” points to the limits of reason and signifies 
intellectual prudence, Bergson’s “as if” comes with no such modesty. Thus 
Bergson ends up with “a sort of connivance [connivence] between life and the 
knowledge of life” rather than with Aristotelian identity or Kantian 
agnosticism, an inexplicable collusion that looks suspiciously like pre-
established harmony.42 Vital repetition would then be inexplicable except for 
the grace God, or rather except for what Jankélévitch called the secret 
proposition of Bergson’s philosophy: the finitude of the élan vital.43 Life 
imitates the concept only because it cannot overcome every obstacle it faces. 
The source of repetition would then be the exhaustion of life’s creativity and 
the ensuing stupor. But we should be careful in reading this “secret 
proposition”: Bergson’s claim is not that life would have remained simple 
and undifferentiated were it not for the intrusion of matter—such a 
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metaphysics is, carried to the extreme, Manicheanism. Life as will and durée 
is first of all self-differentiation: it is more like an artillery shell (obus) that 
bursts apart into fragments in its very movement than a cannonball (boulet) 
that remains unitary across its arc.44  
In sum, Bergson depreciates speciation and repetition of form. Now, if 
we know today that the process of transmission occurs by way of a material 
component, Bergson does not stand refuted simply on a scientific basis 
alone. Canguilhem accuses Bergson of failing to make sense of the centrality 
to life of the struggle to maintain a species form.45 If life is creation and the 
upsurge of novelty for Bergson, Canguilhem’s conception is more focused 
on resistance to death and sickness. They differ not only in the science they 
use, but also in how each of them “reads” it philosophically.46 In 
Canguilhem’s case, however, what philosophy reads is already a reading: of 
the genetic code of life.  
Canguilhem holds that the discovery of the structure of DNA returns us 
to a kind of Aristotelianism. Knowledge of life is now a matter of 
deciphering or reading the material “message” or “logos” inscribed in life 
itself; life is essentially text.47 As Michel Morange has observed, this 
interpretation of genetics as a text is outdated today and misunderstands the 
science even of the 1960s; the structure of proteins—let alone “innate 
patterns of behavior”—cannot be directly deduced from the genetic code, 
but presupposes an historical relationship with the milieu.48 Philosophically, 
Canguilhem faces three major difficulties. First, he seems to slip from the 
metaphor of “reading” the genetic code to one of “finding” explanatory 
“keys”: he risks sliding into a precritical theory of knowledge that ignores 
how much this reading is instructed and prepared by the development of 
mathematics, instruments, and techniques. Second, a massive slippage has 
happened in the notion of the concept itself, which is hardly the general 
classificatory idea discussed earlier in the essay. Can the forms of modern 
biology be said to have anything more than a mere etymological 
resemblance to the forms of Aristotle’s biology? More precisely, the genesis 
and development of living beings does not proceed strictly according to a 
concept in the older sense (a unitary form where the end is contained in the 
beginning), but rather the unity and solidity of a species form is itself only a 
momentary stabilization. Canguilhem himself cites Louis Roule’s expression 
that all forms are simply “normalized monsters” in a history of mutations.49 
Finally, an equally important slippage happens in the concept of reading 
itself: can there be anything but a play on words that connects the reading of 
DNA in the formation of proteins, the reading of the genetic code by 
biology, and the reading of biology by philosophy? 
Canguilhem’s surprising move in the final pages of the article is to draw 
a heavy analogy between “inborn errors of metabolism” and epistemic 
errors.50 He founds the human recherche de la vérité on error, understood as 
the errancy and displacement of the human organism, rather than a 
A l e x  F e l d m a n  |  1 6 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.775 
teleological relation to the essence of things. In other words, the logos or 
sense in life is nothing stable (its form is not produced by a divine artisan), 
but is rather the outcome of a contingent process of evolution, a momentary 
“normalization” (Roule) of mutations. “La vie aurait donc abouti par erreur 
à ce vivant capable d’erreur” (“life would then have ended up by error [i.e., 
through mutation and through errors of genetic transmission] at this living 
being capable of error”).51 In turn, the human being is always errant 
(wandering), i.e., without fixed domicile or habit, and it is precisely this 
errancy that makes knowledge, as another vital function, open to an ever-
increasing variety of information and to the experience of error that breaks 
with immediate satisfaction in the thing known. The openness of the concept 
as form to a limitless content is thus the result of a certain history of rectified 
errors, a history of the errancy or restlessness of the concept itself. For these 
reasons, as we will see, Canguilhem’s vital concept hardly imprisons life in a 
fixed form.  
 
II 
We have already expressed a worry that Canguilhem’s target is not really 
Bergson, but rather a certain Bergsonism. On three points, his reading is 
suspect: his understanding of duration, his interpretation of habit as reflex, 
and, above all, his reading of The Creative Mind. Nevertheless, in other areas, 
Canguilhem is closer to Bergson than he sometimes suspects. Before 
addressing, then, these three points, we will have to reconstitute the 
problem of vital order as it arises on Bergson’s own terms.  
Recall first of all that the stated ambition of Creative Evolution is twofold, 
even if the conventional wisdom focuses only on the first aspect, the 
philosophy of life. In fact, Bergson believes that taking evolution in its 
creativity seriously means radically rethinking the theory of knowledge as 
well.52 The intelligence is also in life and thus in natural history, which 
means the power of understanding must have a history or genesis as well; 
an evolutionary philosophy worthy of its name cannot cheat here by 
smuggling back in teleological or preformationist principles. But this is 
precisely what even philosophers (Fichte, Spencer) who pretend to take the 
problem of the genesis of the intelligence seriously end up doing.53 Bergson 
approaches the problem of genesis along two axes. The first, given in the 
treatment of the “diverging lines of evolution” in Chapter II, challenges the 
traditional reading of intelligence as a perfected or sublated instinct. Instinct 
and intelligence share a common origin, granting, as always in Bergson, that 
this original impulsion or élan vital is an “unstable balance [équilibre] of 
tendencies” that proceeds by division.54 What results is a movement of 
differentiation where the differences in question (the development of 
intelligence and of instinct) are in kind and not in degree.55 Instinct and 
intelligence cannot be said to be contained in the original tendency (tendance) 
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as two preformed possibilities, but are instead “reciprocally implied” in one 
another like two psychological states in an indistinct multiplicity.56 They 
represent two “radically different kinds of knowledge.”57 Both instinct and 
intelligence are pragmatic and utilitarian faculties of adaptation to nature, 
but the first adapts to organized nature, whereas the second adapts to 
unorganized nature (matter). 
The second, and more radical move, comes in Chapter III, where 
Bergson passes from the theory-of-knowledge perspective to the mutual 
implication of epistemology and metaphysics, of mind and nature. Bergson’s 
task now is to show the reciprocal genesis of matter and the intelligence from 
out of the original élan by shifting to a quasi-cosmological perspective.58 In 
other words, neither term is taken as the origin of the other: Bergson 
eschews both a materialist account of the genesis of the mind from matter 
and an idealist account of the genesis of matter from mind. Instead, the two 
are co-constitutive, or rather they represent two distinct tendencies of the 
original élan. Without going into the details of this move, I would like to 
emphasize the relationship between the problem of the reciprocal genesis of 
matter and the intelligence in Creative Evolution and the twin critique of 
realism and idealism in Matter and Memory.59 In this Preface added to latter 
in 1910, Bergson praises Berkeley, who refused the early modern rejection of 
the reality of secondary qualities, as found, for example, in Descartes, for 
whom the fundamental reality of material things is their geometrical 
extension. Yet Berkeley’s idealism goes so far in the other direction that it 
makes the mathematical order that exists in the universe unintelligible 
without the intervention of God: he saves the secondary qualities of matter 
precisely by making matter an idea. That is, from the extreme of Descartes, 
for whom the essence of things is the geometrical relationship between 
them, Berkeley goes toward the other extreme by placing matter in the 
mind.  From the perspective of Bergson’s theory of the primacy of images 
(the image as existing “in itself” and “in between” or mi-chemin between 
divisible and material repeatability and the ideal unity), however, it could be 
possible to avoid the Kantian solution to the crisis provoked by Berkeley and 
Hume, as well as Kant’s sacrifice of metaphysics to physics. Kant guarantees 
the rationality of mathematical physics by critically limiting the validity of 
the senses and the ambitions of the understanding.  Now, argues Bergson, 
starting with images allows philosophy to make the mathematical order of 
the universe intelligible without this process of intellectual self-limitation 
necessitated by the Kantian critique.60 
If epistemology and ontology as diverging philosophical projects have 
grown out of the Kantian rupture, that is, out of a choice between idealism 
and realism concerning the origin of order in the universe, Bergson instead 
poses the problem of order in itself, prior to the divergence of these two 
tendencies.61 Now, this problem of order is to a certain extent a non-
problem, as Bergson famously argues across his later work; to ask “why is 
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there order and not rather disorder” is to import a certain pragmatic 
experience, our powerlessness in the face of an order that is superior to our 
capabilities, into the realm of speculation.62 The problem of knowledge, at 
least in its radical Cartesian variety of the threat of absolute unintelligibility, 
is a false problem, as Bergson argues a number of times: it rests on the idea of 
the possibility of radical or absolute disorder and incoherence in the world. 
Such a disorder is, however, inconceivable to us except by way of a false 
generalization of our general ideas, and every actual representation of a 
disorder is merely that of another order that we have not mastered.63 In sum, 
the problem of disorder is based upon the “intellectualist illusion” that the 
whole of reality can be represented in a concept and thence negated.64 
Consequently, the mutual implication of the theory of knowledge and 
the philosophy of life proposed by Bergson in the Introduction to Creative 
Evolution should be seen as merely a provisional step toward a superior 
philosophical position that surpasses the configuration of problems 
bequeathed by the post-Cartesian tradition, dependent as they are upon the 
artificial separation of subject and object. By this I do not mean that 
epistemology utterly evaporates, but that its problems are placed in 
appropriate perspective and even change shape. One such new problem is to 
account for the simultaneous openness and restriction of knowing, what in 
traditional rationalism is seen as the limitlessness of the power of the 
understanding to bring reality under its concept, confronted with the very 
real limits of actual knowledge (or, in the Kantian sense, the recognition of 
the limits of the understanding). In fact, if the subject of knowledge and 
object of knowledge share a common root in Bergson, the problem might 
seem instead to be how the mind does not already reach the essence of all 
things, but of course the mind is not this limitless and transcendental power 
in Bergson. Intellectual knowledge is practical adaptation to working with 
matter, but the adaptation requires effort, which means that it does not 
follow automatically or mechanically from matter but requires the “solution 
of problems,” the creation of new habits.65 The growth of knowledge then is 
the problem of breaking through the barriers created by old intellectual 
habits in order to open the mind to conceptual creation: it will be the 
problem of intuition.   
On the other hand, the special problem of knowledge of life remains. 
Intelligence, as fabrication, entails the giving of a form to a matter. But 
insofar as the aim of fabrication is the form, at the limit any matter will 
suffice. At the most extreme, this “indifference” of the matter to the form 
gives us a homogeneous space that can be decomposed or cut up however 
we wish; the intelligence thus projects such a partes extra partes space as the 
“schema” of all of our possible actions upon matter.66 The limitlessness of 
the operations of the intelligence runs up, however, against its natural 
inability to comprehend the indistinct multiplicity that is life.67 From this sort 
of remark uncharitable readers have sometimes assumed that life is 
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impenetrable to concepts, general ideas, symbols, language, or anything else 
that depends upon the repeatability of a form. At the limit, life is pure 
singularity to be felt in intuition, and the letter is taken to be abnegation of 
the possibility of knowing (whereas we have seen in fact that Bergson’s 
project rejects the Kantian critique’s limitation of reason for the sake of 
metaphysics).68 Any repetition of vital forms would only be a kind of 
betrayal of the élan vital’s undifferentiated creative movement, and all 
conceptual knowledge of life would attain only life’s illusory underside.  
Canguilhem’s criticisms of Bergson can now be situated more precisely: 
Canguilhem rejects the epistemologically defeatist reading of Creative 
Evolution, but he accepts its basic terms. He is therefore led to neglect the 
crucial way in which the 1907 book sets up a difference in kind between two 
types of order, geometrical and vital. Vital order is not simply a poor 
imitation of identity.  
We can now address the three missteps in Canguilhem’s 
argumentation: 
1. Duration (durée). Bergson’s idea of duration treats the succession or 
progression of time positively, as neither a lack of  present co-existence nor a 
“privation of eternity,” but rather as an upsurge of novelty and 
unforeseeability (imprévisibilité).69 Duration names the time of existence and 
of change, not as a succession of states, but as the unpredictable upsurge of 
novelty in a continuous temporal movement or evolution, a kind of non-
teleological ripening or maturing.70 Recall that Canguilhem equates this 
centerpiece of Bergson’s thought with pure and unconditioned creativity.71 
To be sure, Bergson does sharply criticize the notion of possibility, according 
to which the real would pre-exist its coming to presence in an idea or 
concept. Yet it is not true that creative evolution is thereby rendered utterly 
inaccessible to concepts. Put differently, while the end (the future) is not 
contained in the beginning (the present), the future does not advent without 
a profound relationship to the past. We could say that this is the problem of 
memory and of virtuality (evolution is an “organic memory”): duration 
signifies not a radical break with the past, but rather that the ground or 
cause of the future event lies in the totality of the past of a living body and 
not in the immediate past.72 Duration is neither one nor multiple: it is 
differentiated according to mutually implicated tendencies, that is, its parts 
are constituted by their interrelations. Life is  
An immensity of virtuality [virtualité], a mutual encroachment of 
thousands and thousands of tendencies which nevertheless will 
only be ‘thousands and thousands’ once each has been exteriorized 
with respect to the others, that is, once spatialized [ne seront 
pourtant ‘mille et mille’ qu’une fois extériorisées les uns par rapport aux 
autres]. Contact with matter is what decides [décide de] this 
dissociation. Matter divides actually what was but virtually 
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multiple; and, in this sense, individuation is in part the work of 
matter, in part the effect of what life bears in itself [ce que la vie porte 
en elle].73 
Elsewhere Bergson calls duration an “indistinct” or “intensive” 
multiplicity.74  
As Pete Gunter has noted, in the Bergsonian account of creative 
evolution, certain general tendencies and characteristics can be observed 
from a more global perspective on life: “Expressions of creativity, whether in 
biological evolution or elsewhere, for him always exhibit the same five 
characteristics: 1) divergence; 2) increased spatiality […]; 3) elaboration of 
spatial form; 4) repetition in time […]; and 5) unique temporalities 
(biological times).”75 In other words, life exhibits certain unities-in-
difference, certain repeated characters, that can be brought under concepts, 
but only once the congealed concepts inherited from mechanism and 
finalism, such as organization, vital effort, materiality, order,  are radically 
re-worked, and biological cause, correlation of traits, adaptation, and vital 
principle.76 Grasping the specificity of vital repetition or resemblance 
requires a particular effort to go beyond inherited habits of thought.  
2. Canguilhem thus misses the intrication of the past, the involvement 
of memory, in the advent of the new, but this oversight leads him to misread 
as well the account of the general idea in Chapter III of Matter and Memory. 
To explain the origin of general idea from perception, Bergson affirms the 
notion of resemblance but rejects both conceptualism and nominalism, 
which rest on the common postulate that initially we encounter only 
individuals; instead, we start with the perception of useful resemblances, 
and the general idea has its origin in habit, in the similarity of reaction to a 
certain spread of situations.77 But Canguilhem’s treatment of this habit as 
reflex is surely too rigid, and it ignores the dynamism of the general idea as 
it moves between generality and singularity: the geometrical idea is simply a 
particularly frozen version of the general idea in Bergson.78 In treating the 
general idea as deriving from a physiological habit, Canguilhem 
dramatically oversimplifies the relationship between memory, action, and 
image at work in this crucial chapter.  
3. Finally, Canguilhem had suggested that Bergson moves from a 
“physiological” account of general ideas in Matter and Memory to one based 
in the things themselves in The Creative Mind. Bergson’s ontology of images 
and his rejection of idealism and realism in the earlier work already gave us 
pause about the accuracy of this interpretation. For our present purposes, 
however, the fundamental error Canguilhem commits is to ignore the 
specificity of biological resemblance in this later work. The mistake is 
encapsulated in a line that Canguilhem attributes to Bergson, but that I have 
been unable to locate in the latter’s corpus: “Life works as if it wanted to 
reproduce the identical.”79 In Creative Evolution, to be sure, Bergson does 
1 6 6  |  T h e  C o n c e p t  i n  L i f e  a n d  t h e  L i f e  o f  t h e  C o n c e p t  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.775 
discuss the relationship between the two types of order, vital-voluntary and 
geometrical-automatic.80 Bergson does seem inclined there to speak to treat 
the generality of genus and species as like the repetition of inorganic forms—
, an imitation of matter by living beings.81 Yet he immediately refers the 
reader back to Chapter I, where the apparent repetition of a structure across 
organisms is not necessarily that of a mold “imprinted” (empreinte) upon a 
matter, but can also be taken as a sign of similar responses to common 
problems.82 Hence, Bergson distinguishes répéter (to repeat) and répliquer (to 
reply, to replicate).83 Indeed, the aim of this earlier discussion in the book 
was to show the similarity of forms that exist across “diverging lines of 
evolution.” This replicative rather than repetitive generality arises, as we saw 
in remark (1) from the commonality of certain tendencies across different 
evolutionary lines, a commonality that should be distinguished from 
repetition of a single species form. To simplify somewhat, whereas 
Canguilhem raises the question of generality at the level of the species, 
Bergson underlines transpecific commonalities and suprageneric tendencies. 
What Bergson does say in The Creative Mind is that “life works as if it 
itself had general ideas,” but since he distinguishes between general ideas 
based on resemblance and general ideas based on identity, we should not 
infer that life works as if according to identity.84 In short, the repetition that 
life “wants to reproduce” (to quote Canguilhem’s misquotation) could be 
one of resemblance and not of identity. The point is urgent because Bergson 
does not define biological resemblance as a failed identity in this late work. 
Whereas geometric identity is reached through the measurability of 
spatialized parts, the reality of biological resemblance is attainable from 
“art” (as in the naturalist’s sketches) and is of a different order.85 This art 
doubtless corresponds to the art whereby living nature produces vital forms 
through a natural and non-mathematical logos. In this sense, as we have 
already noted, Canguilhem is right to detect an Aristotelian heritage.86 Once 
more, however, nothing in Bergson’s approach rules out a collaboration 
between mathematical and artistic approaches to the knowledge of life. It is 
this dynamic collaboration of intuition and intelligence that appears to be 
lost on Canguilhem.87 
 
III 
I would like to close with two brief remarks, for, despite my conviction that 
Canguilhem’s criticisms of Bergson largely miss the mark, I also think there 
are two crucial points of profound contact with Bergson in Canguilhem’s 
late thought. 
1. I have already expressed my skepticism about the project of deriving 
the epistemic concept from the genetic code. Canguilhem’s truly provocative 
insight is rather to have linked the distinctiveness and normativity of 
biological concepts to the normativité of living beings: their tendency to 
A l e x  F e l d m a n  |  1 6 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.775 
institute their own values, to live according to their own norms, gives a real 
“pretext” in the living being for the concepts that seek to comprehend life.88 
In “Le problème de la normalité dans l’histoire de la pensée biologique,” 
written in 1973, Canguilhem once more reflects on the specificity of the 
history of the biological sciences and on an overly discontinuist notion of 
this history. Whereas Dmitri Mendeleev hardly confirms the “intuitions” of 
Democritus, modern genetics does justify to a certain extent the 
“metaphors” of homeostasis and regulation of Claude Bernard through a 
“displacement” of these concepts’ initial content and their reconfiguration as 
“indices of an objective originality.”89 The great value of this essay as a 
complement to “Le concept et la vie” is that it gives real examples of 
biological concepts and their peculiar nature, e.g., normality, homeostasis, 
and regulation. Much more clearly than in “Le concept et la vie,” 
Canguilhem argues that biological knowledge is responsive to a kind of 
“given” in the thing to be known, “une donnée de la vie”: not its genetic 
code per se, but rather the living being as “self-conservation through self-
regulation.”90 The concept is “in” life as a vital order based on the 
maintenance of “a system in unstable dynamic equilibrium, maintained in 
its ordered structure by a continual borrowing of energing at the expense of 
a milieu characterized by molecular disorder or by the frozen order of the 
crystal;”91 this system is a “viable but fallible” form that is the historically 
contingent outcome of a process of evolution.92 Such an order is not an 
imitation of geometrical identity, but rather the expression of the 
normativity of living beings at every level. The order is something 
“instituted by life itself,” as Jean Gayon puts, rightly seeing here a similarity 
between Canguilhem and Bergson.93 
2. Both Bergson and Canguilhem agree that knowledge has a history 
that is not merely the sign of the weakness of the human mind. In his 
objection to Laplace, Bergson insists that time is not merely an illusion with 
which an omniscient god could dispense, and he must surely also mean the 
time of knowing.94 But just as the sense of life and the sense in life is 
founded, for Canguilhem, on the possibility of going astray—of error—
knowledge in its historicity gets its normativity as the rectifying and 
overcoming of errors and obstacles.95 The primacy of error and errancy in 
Canguilhem’s thought is perhaps what most radically distinguishes him 
from Bergson.96 Epistemically, it is the power of free judgment to affirm the 
false that affords the possibility of the imaginary, of the proliferation of 
images that allow scientific knowledge to reach beyond its present and 
anticipate its future. More work needs to be done on the possible connection 
between Canguilhem’s theory of error and his theory of the imaginary.97 
Indeed, many of Canguilhem’s histories (of the reflex, of the cell) emphasize 
the productivity of images in the history of scientific thought. As for 
Bernard’s metaphor of self-conservation, that we can now speak of it in less 
metaphorical terms (namely at the molecular level), does not mean that we 
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have undergone a successful purging of our previous images, but only that 
they have been “displaced.”98  
If Canguilhem seems to think that Bergson lacks a proper theory of the 
imaginary because of his refusal of negativity, his emphasis on the 
productive role of images is quite close to Bergson’s own developed 
understanding of the relationship between intuition, image, and concept. 
Intuitions are incapable of being captured in words, and yet they pass over 
with a kind of necessity (as Bergson puts it in a 1936 letter to Floris Delattre) 
into images, which in turn enclose an ensemble of ideas, difficulties, and 
things unknown (les ignorances).99 The élan vital is just such an image:  
[T]he image intervenes most often because it is indispensable, none 
of the other existing concepts being able to express the author’s 
thought; the author is then obliged to present it suggestively [obligé 
de la suggérer]. This suggestion can only come about by way of an 
image, but an image that the philosopher has not chosen, one that 
as the sole means of communication and that imposes itself with an 
absolute necessity. To give just one example: when I relate the 
phenomena of life and of evolution to an “élan vital,” it is in no 
way an ornament of style. It is even less meant to mask in images 
our ignorance of the deepest causes, as when the vitalist in general 
invokes a “vital principle.” […] The truth is that philosophy only 
offers philosophers two principles of explanation in this matter: 
mechanism and finalism. […] Now […] the place to be is 
somewhere in between these two concepts. How should we 
determine that place? I have to point to it, to indicate it [il faut bien 
que je l’indique du doigt] since no concept between mechanism and 
finality exists. The image of an élan is only this indication.100 
Crucially, the indexical character of the image is not an injunction to halt 
one’s thinking, but to create new concepts. It is hard not to be struck here by 
the fact that both Canguilhem and Bergson see a role in biological 
knowledge for the image; it is also hard not be struck by the non-arbitrary 
nature of the image, indeed by its necessity, by which Bergson must mean 
that its normativity for thought is quasi-apodictic.  
Strikingly, a decade prior to “Le concept et la vie,” Canguilhem had 
himself glimpsed this proximity between Bergson’s thought on images and 
the Bachelardian approach to the history of the sciences that he was in the 
process of adopting. Bachelard’s challenge to the Enlightenment conception 
of rationalism was to insist that a certain kind of error, the “epistemological 
obstacle,” is actually a creative “force;”101 the progress of knowledge is not 
the systematic expulsion of images, but rather depends upon a 
boundlessness production of images. Canguilhem writes,  
Just as materiality and the science of matter only retain, in 
Bergson’s eyes, some positivity through their relation to the élan 
A l e x  F e l d m a n  |  1 6 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.775 
vital whose direction [sens] they invert, so too do the aggressive 
rationalization of the real and the violence of knowledge only seem 
to reside, according to M. Bachelard, in the dialectical process of 
negation that inverts the direction of a sort of imaging élan [élan 
imageant].102 
Canguilhem reads the difficult question of the relationship between 
Bachelard’s epistemological works and his studies of images as having 
ultimately ontological implications: a non-identitarian theory of Being as 
poiesis, much as Bergson’s durée implies continuous creation and upsurge of 
novelty.103  
Today, Canguilhem is often treated as a representative of French 
historical epistemology, and his final reckoning with Bergson in “Le concept 
et la vie” would seem to attest his move from a more speculative philosophy 
of life and interest in vitalism to a more sober concern for the history of the 
life sciences. In criticizing Canguilhem’s interpretation of Bergson, my aim 
has not been to dismiss Canguilhem, but rather to retrieve those points that 
are most philosophically fertile in his thought and that rejoin the position 
that Bergson achieved: an ontological point of view from which he could 
think the openness and dynamism of order and intelligibility without 
succumbing to the traditional alternatives of idealism and realism. A 
renewed dialogue with Bergson’s philosophy, “provided,” as Canguilhem 
himself recognized, “that one read it without prejudice,” would perhaps 
stimulate the current project to place his epistemology back into a larger set 
of philosophical concerns.104 
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